Since the global food crisis of 2007/08 and 2011, when the sharp rise in global food prices triggered concerns about food security, malnutrition and poverty in food importing countries, many Arab states have been reappraising their approach to food security. Rising food prices along with export bans by a number of key exporting countries meant that most Arab states, that are heavily dependent on imports for over 50% of their food needs, became fearful of both price and quantity shocks and the effects on their domestic economy and society. It has been argued elsewhere by this writer that the price shock of 2007/08 and the second shock of 2011, led to significant domestic food price inflation in Arab countries and was one of the trigger factors behind the Arab Spring.
The orthodox approach to food security in the region has been to rely on a trade-based food security strategy, whereby non-agricultural goods as well as water efficient agricultural goods such as fruits, vegetables and tree crops are exported and the foreign exchange earned is used to import food especially water intensive cereals such as wheat. But in the new era of volatile global food markets many Arab states have started to question this orthodox approach to achieving food security due to the vulnerabilities it can create. In its place has come a new concept of “macro food sovereignty” as coined in my recent book.
The term macro food sovereignty reflects the idea that sovereign states want to increase their power and control over their access to national food supplies and critically, that in so doing, they may be willing to ignore the dictates of economics as reflected in market forces and to formulate food security strategies that incorporate political and social considerations rather than just economic considerations.
The new Arab food sovereignty is manifest in two distinct recent policy thrusts. Firstly a drive to produce more food domestically and secondly, especially for the richer countries in the region such as the Gulf states, new initiatives to acquire land in third party host countries in order to directly produce food to ship home and so by-pass global food markets. An example of the former is Jordan’s five year National Food Security Strategy (2014-2019) which has as its first of four objectives to “Increase the amount of available food through enhancing domestic agricultural production and marketing”. A recent example of the latter is the Saudi Arabian King Abdullah’s Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad (KAISAIA) launched in January 2008.
Both of the new approaches to macro food sovereignty are controversial. Growing more food domestically, especially cereals, does not represent a sensible use of scare economic resources such as limited water and arable land in many Arab states. Recently Jordan was planning to use United Nations compensation funding for the Gulf War to launch a large cereal growing project in her rangelands but abandoned the idea after research showed it to be too economically costly. Land acquisition overseas, often referred to as “land grab” is also controversial. It can involve displacing local people in the host country from their land which creates risks for the investing country, can jeopardize food security in host countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan and Pakistan which have been the targets of Gulf States and raises environmental and labor issues.
It is clear that recent upheavals in global food markets have caused Arab States to rethink their approach to food security and that this has resulted in a shift towards macro food sovereignty. This has given rise to the need for new policy focused work. Research is needed to assess the costs and benefits of domestic food production projects so that policy makers are fully aware of the trade-offs and opportunity costs involved. Only then can informed decisions be made. Land acquisitions overseas also need to be subject to greater scrutiny and new models, such as investing in people rather than land, need to be explored as a way forward. In addition, the recent fall back in global food prices means that Arab States may themselves start to reappraise whether the trust towards greater macro food sovereignty is indeed the best way forward or whether the orthodox policy advice of a trade-based food security strategy is the best way forward.
Professor Jane Harrigan - jh66@soas.ac.uk @ProfJaneH