Youth Bulges and Political Violence

May 9, 2019

Hosam Ibrahim, Senior Research Assistant, IFPRI-Egypt

 

 

 

 

The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development hosted the Economic Research Forum’s (ERF) Annual Conference throughout 10-12 March 2019 in Kuwait City, Kuwait. This year’s conference was held under the theme of Knowledge, Research Networks, and Development Policy. The ERF Annual Conference, a tradition maintained since 1995, has become the premier regional event for economists of the Middle East; where new ideas are created and disseminated, where the community of researchers meet, and where excellence is celebrated. This year’s conference was very special as it marked the 25th anniversary of the ERF, which was established in 1993 to build a strong research capacity in the region. It was one of the first institutions to connect economic researchers from across the region.

My participation in the conference entailed presenting a research paper I authored on intrastate conflict and youth bulges. The paper investigates the relationship between domestic political conflict and youth bulges in economically stagnant societies. Considering the growing debate on population pressures and resource scarcity, I would argue that their combined effect will likely increase the risk of violence. In this context, the paper estimates the heterogenous economic effect of large young cohorts on the likelihood of riots, coups and civil wars. The conceptual framework of the paper is illustrated in figure 1.

Large young cohorts, during periods of economic stagnation, are expected to cause demand-induced scarcities that create grievances for the educated youth due to high unemployment, potentially leading to more political violence. Using panel data on conflict, polity and demographic and economic characteristics, the paper’s contribution is twofold. First, is to estimate the effect of youth bulges on political violence, where the latter is modelled as a continuum process (in terms of scale) covering riots, coups and civil wars. Second, I assess the extent to which the impact of youth bulges on political violence might depend on the level of youth unemployment and education.

Studying the impact of youth bulges on conflict started in the 1960’s, while gaining much of interest during the past two decades in light of the recent debate on population pressures and resource scarcity. The youth bulge phenomenon under certain circumstances is statistically associated with political unrest, as the percentage of a young population (relative to adults) rises the probability of intra-state conflict increases. Compellingly, the probability that any of such events occur is the highest amongst countries with higher youth bulges, at the 70-90^th percentile: youth bulges of 33-36% (see table 1). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Huntington (1993) state that the activity of most fundamentalist movements is sustained by young and educated individuals seeking scarce opportunities to join a particular social elite. Therefore, as the percentage of young individuals increase, in countries suffering from economic stagnation and political dissolution, the likelihood of political violence also increases.

 

Table 1 Youth Bulges and Political Violence

Youth Bulge Percentiles	Youth Bulges	Youth unemployment (%)	Second & tertiary enrollment (per 1000)	Riots	Coups	Civil wars
		Average per group		% of violence
10	11-18%	18.5	3,289	19.7	0.7	0.7
20	18-21%	22.1	4,747	13.6	0.5	2.0
30	21-25%	19.8	4,054	19.6	1.3	0.6
40	25-29%	20.5	2,903	21.6	1.3	2.1
50	29-31%	16.6	7,530	20.0	1.6	2.5
60	31-33%	15.9	2,649	16.8	1.7	2.5
70	33-34%	14.0	1,368	20.6	1.7	4.1
80	34-35%	15.6	1,069	20.6	8.1	5.9
90	35-36%	15.7	838	16.2	6.2	6.7
100	36-42%	16.1	506	12.8	3.6	2.2

Source: Banks (2016), Powell & Thyne (2011), Armed Conflict (PRIO) and U.S. Census Bureau (2018)

 

I find robust positive effect of youth bulges on the different forms of political violence, where the effect was found to be non-monotonic in the case of civil wars. That is, the effect of youth bulges on conflict is not strictly linear. As youth bulges increase, the probability of political violence increases to a certain level and then starts declining. Figure 1 below further demonstrates the significantly non-monotonic relationship between youth bulges and civil wars. The below figure shows the marginal effect of a 1% increase in youth bulges on the probability of civil wars and coups. Expectedly the point at which youth bulges maximize the change in the likelihood of civil wars is significantly higher than that for coup attempts. As civil wars often require much more manpower than coups do.

Research by social scientists point to the relationship between large young cohorts and different forms of political violence. All identifying the availability and cost of recruitment as one of the main determinants of conflict onset. The main hypothesis of this paper is that youth availability and the cost of recruiting young people are significantly relevant determinants of political violence. In terms of availability, as the number of young people increase it is easier to recruit rebels (Collier 2000). From young people’s perspective, the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion drastically declines in times of economic hardships.

The impact of youth bulges facing fierce competition in the labor market calls for inclusive growth policies. Policies aimed at encouraging entrepreneurship and ease of doing business, not only provide an alternative to traditional job markets, but also ease the pressure on the government to provide public sector jobs for the youth bulge. Additionally, such policies are known to transform informal employment to the formal sector, boosting the productivity of such businesses in the process. Productivity and high returns to non-rebellion activities are key to increasing the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion. Government policies must aim to enshrine two rather essential values in their youth. One is a sense of nationalization and ownership in the state’s institutions; and two, is the high returns of non-rebellion labor.

 

References

Collier, Paul. 2000. “Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective.” In Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, edited by Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, 91–111. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press 56 (4): 563–95. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpf064.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (3): 22–49.